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Calvinist Metaphysics to Republican Theory: Jonathan Edwards and
James Dana on Freedom of the Will
Abstract
The Reverend Mr. James Dana, the pastor of the First Church in Wallingford, Connecticut, had never before
attempted to pick a quarrel with his old friend and ally, Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale College. But in the
winter of 1782 what was happening at Yale passed all the bounds of propriety and friendship. "I have
understood that Mr. Edwards's book on fatality was laid aside some years since at your university," Dana wrote
(not stopping to add what he surely must have thought, and good riddance too); but now, "it gave me pain to
hear lately" that the divinity professor, the epileptic Samuel Wales, "particularly recommends this book to the
young gentlemen who are studying divinity under his direction." Have you forgotten, Dana irritably asked,
what kind of damage Jonathan Edwards and his Careful and Strict Enquiry in the Modern Prevailing Notions of
that Freedom of Will, which is supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Reward and Punishment
had done since the book appeared in 1754? "I need not say to you, sir, that it has been the root of bitterness
which has troubled us...like Achan in the camp of Israel, Hopkintonianism, Westianism, and Schism are grafted
upon it." It promoted fatalism and mechanism, "and if mechanism doth not explode moral good and evil, I
have not the slightest pretence to any mental discernment." Not only mechanism and fatalism, "Murrayism,
Deism, and atheism" also sprang indiscriminately from the head of Edwards's book; Dana even blamed the
sensational murder-suicide of William Beadle that summer on "the principles" of "Mr. Edwards's system."
Suppress the book, Dana pleaded, "interpose your good influence, that so dangerous a book be not introduced
into college again." [excerpt]
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From Calvinist Metaphysics to 
Republican Theory: 
Jonathan Edwards and James Dana 
on Freedom of the Will 
Allen C. Guelzo 
The Reverend Mr. James Dana, the pastor of the First Church in 
Wallingford, Connecticut, had never before attempted to pick a quarrel with 
his old friend and ally, Ezra Stiles, the president of Yale College. But in the 
winter of 1782 what was happening at Yale passed all the bounds of propriety 
and friendship. "I have understood that Mr. Edwards's book on fatality was 
laid aside some years since at your university," Dana wrote (not stopping to 
add what he surely must have thought, and good riddance too); but now, "it 
gave me pain to hear lately" that the divinity professor, the epileptic Samuel 
Wales, "particularly recommends this book to the young gentlemen who are 
studying divinity under his direction." Have you forgotten, Dana irritably 
asked, what kind of damage Jonathan Edwards and his Careful and Strict 
Enquiry in the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of Will, which is 
supposed to be essential to Moral Agency, Vertue and Vice, Reward and 
Punishment had done since the book appeared in 1754? "I need not say to 
you, sir, that it has been the root of bitterness which has troubled us...like 
Achan in the camp of Israel, Hopkintonianism, Westianism, and Schism are 
grafted upon it." It promoted fatalism and mechanism, "and if mechanism 
doth not explode moral good and evil, I have not the slightest pretence to any 
mental discernment." Not only mechanism and fatalism, "Murrayism, De- 
ism, and atheism" also sprang indiscriminately from the head of Edwards's 
book; Dana even blamed the sensational murder-suicide of William Beadle 
that summer on "the principles" of "Mr. Edwards's system." Suppress the 
The author wishes to thank Charles L. Cohen, Bruce Kuklick, Michael Zuckerman, 
and the members of the Philadelphia Center for Early American Studies for their comments 
on an earlier version of this essay. 
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400 Allen C. Guelzo 
book, Dana pleaded, "interpose your good influence, that so dangerous a 
book be not introduced into college again."'" 
Jonathan Edwards certainly had his critics, but the depth of Dana's 
animus towards Edwards, and especially Edwards's treatise on the will, has 
few parallels, then or now. By the time he wrote his letter to Stiles, Dana had 
already written a two-volume rebuttal of Freedom of the Will, which became 
the single longest piece of sustained philosophical invective in eighteenth- 
century American literature; and he spent another twenty-five y ars after his 
letter to Stiles trying to persuade Yale College and anyone else who would 
listen that it was the ideas packed into Freedom of the Will... and not the ideas 
of Tom Paine or Ethan Allen.. .which were leading New England Calvinism 
down to road to obliteration. The baleful influence of Edwards's "book on 
fatality" existed on multiple levels for Dana, which was what made "this 
book" so unfit for Yale undergraduates. Dana was convinced that it led to 
intellectual despair and loss of faith, that it disrupted town and church life by 
fostering schism, and that in the largest context it would threaten to capsize 
the fragile stability of New England's emerging republican order. This might 
have been, for Ezra Stiles, a great deal to impute to a fairly esoteric treatise on 
the age-old problem of free will and determinism; but for Dana the free will 
problem and political ideas about freedom were connected discourses in 
which the wider the notion of free will, the narrower the concept of republi- 
can liberty was likely to be. Thus, his apparently arcane debate over 
Edwards's deterministic metaphysics came to represent a contest not just 
over terms but over the life of the mind and of society and even the shape of 
the republic itself. 
Dana's dread of Jonathan Edwards did not arise out of any personal 
antagonism between the two...Edwards, in fact, died in New Jersey six 
months before Dana arrived in Connecticut as an untried Harvard graduate to 
become the Wallingford church's pastor. But Edwards's New Light follow- 
ers and admirers among the clergy of the Standing Order in Connecticut had 
crossed Dana's path even before he became the pastor of Wallingford; and in 
the fall of 1758, in the most sensational ecclesiastical rift in the history of 
Connecticut Congregationalism, they had nearly managed to thwart his call 
to the Wallingford church. Wallingford had been a preserve of Old Light 
conservatism all through the Great Awakening and of Old Calvinist opposi- 
tion thereafter, due in large measure to the skillful management of the parish 
by the Wallingford First Church's first two ministers, Samuel Street (in- 
stalled 1674) and Samuel Whittelsey (installed 1717).2 Unhappily, when the 
I James Dana to Ezra Stiles, 18 December 1782, in the Ezra Stiles Papers (microfilm 
reel 4), Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
2 Robert J. Taylor, Colonial Connecticut: A History (New York, 1979), 121; Gerald E. 
Farrell, "Dana, Whittelsey, and Wallingford: Change in the Eighteenth Century" (unpub- 
lished manuscript, November 1987, Connecticut Historical Society), 3-6, 8-9; and James 
Dana, A Century Discourse at the Anniversary Meeting of the Freemen of the Town of 
Wallingford April 9, 1770 (New Haven, 1770), 31. "Old Light" was the general term used 
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23-year-old James Dana arrived in Wallingford as Whittelsey's successor in 
1758, he could not suppress the urge to measure Wallingford against Harvard 
Yard and to treat Wallingford people accordingly. A group of suspicious 
Wallingford New Lights confronted him shortly after the call was issued and 
grilled him about "his sentiments, with regard to original sin, and the saints 
perseverance, with regard to the power of free will, and falling from grace," 
and how well he liked Connecticut's Saybrook Platform. 
Dana replied sharply, "why we do not ask him how he lik'd John 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, or Esoph's Fables"? The New Lights were not 
amused. In July, eighty members of the Wallingford church petitioned the 
New Haven Association, declaring that they "are not willing to have Mr. 
James Dana settled in the work of the ministry amongst us"; and on 10 
October 1758 the consociation of New Haven East met at Wallingford to hear 
the charges against Dana.3 The charges involved a mixture of theological 
heresy and injured feelings: Dana was accused of having "wholly Neglected 
the Doctrine of the new Birth and the Safety [of] appearing in [the] Righ- 
teousness of Christ" and of having taught "that true Religion is built upon a 
Principle of Self Love." But it was plain that his greatest offense was 
intellectual snobbery, having unwisely declared to the petitioners "that he 
valued not if there were 150 signers against him for that a great part of them 
were Soft Heads & void of Understanding."4 
Dana's theological offense was less obvious. His crime, in the eyes of the 
New Lights, was not that he actually disbelieved in "original sin, and the 
saints perseverance," but that he claimed that these matters were "myster- 
ies" which human reason could only accept passively as brute facts of divine 
revelation and which one should not press harder than common sense and the 
to identify all anti-revivalist clergy and laity in New England during the Second Awaken- 
ing; "Old Calvinist" became the term used to describe those Old Lights who, after the 
Awakening, remained within the general orbit of Calvinist orthodoxy and did not move 
over to unitarianism or deism. See Mark A. Noll, "Ebenezer Devotion," Church History, 
45 (1976), 297-307 and "Moses Mather (Old Calvinist) and the Evolution of Edwards- 
eanism," Church History, 49 (1980), 275-83, Sidney E. Mead, Nathaniel William Taylor, 
1786-1858: A Connecticut Liberal (Chicago, 1942), 97-124, and Henry F. May, The En- 
lightenment inAmerica (New York, 1976), 60-61. 
3 C. H. S. Davis, History of Wallingford, Conn. From Its Settlement in 1670 to the 
Present Time (Meriden, Conn., 1870), 164; Leonard Bacon, Thirteen Historical Dis- 
courses, On the Completion of Two Hundred Years, From the Beginning of the First Church 
in New Haven (New Haven, 1839), 267-68; "James Dana," in Sibley's Harvard Graduates, 
ed. Clifford K. Shipton (15 vols.; Boston, 1965), XIII, 306; The First Congregational 
Church, Wallingford, Conn. (Wallingford, 1975), 27; and "To the Reverand Samuel Hall 
Moderator of the Consociation in New Haven County," and "We the subscribing members 
of the first Society," in New Haven East Association Papers Relating to the Church in 
Wallingford, 1758-1832, Beinecke Library. 
' "To the Rev'd Consociation of New Haven County to be held at Wallingford at the 
house of Charles Sperry" (10/27/1758) in New Haven East Association Papers Relating to 
the Church in Wallingford, 1758-1832, Beinecke Library. 
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Standing Order authorized.5 Dana never doubted that "all power is of God, 
derived from him, and subject to him," and so "he numbereth the hairs of 
our heads, and disposeth the most contingent and casual events."6 But he did 
not want that conviction descending into fatalism, and he was convinced that 
the radical Calvinism being preached up by the New Lights could only lead in 
that direction. Dana knew all too well that over the previous eighty-odd 
years, Thomas Hobbes, Anthony Collins, and a flock of "Pr-actical theists" 
had taken the Calvinistic doctrines of divine sovereignty and predestination 
and turned them neatly into system of hard mechanistic determinism, and he 
was certain that following radical New Light Calvinism into a fixation with 
the subject would lead people eventually to confusion, to depair, and to 
Hobbes. 
What was critical to Dana was to assert the divine ordination of all 
events, but not in too much detail, and to proclaim divine election as a fact, 
which, of course, unaided human reason cannot expect to reconcile with 
human freedom.7 Ultimately, what set Dana decisively off from the Calvin- 
ism of the New Lights was not Enlightenment rationalism... .his position was 
based on the incapacity of reasoning, not its powers.. nor an outright disbe- 
lief in divine election but rather his conviction that "liberty, necessity and 
prescience are subjects of which we have no adequate ideas."8 
If we have no adequate ideas of them, then they cannot be taken as self- 
evident guides to determining the spiritual condition of others, nor can the 
established church be detached from the larger context of human society as a 
refuge for the elect come-outers. "We must not judge the character of 
professing Christian from detached parts, or from any darkness occasioned 
by external circumstances, or a mind overclouded and impaired," Dana 
urged; "every real Christian has grace, whether he himself discerns it or not: 
Yea, whether it is in actual exercise or not." There may be "the habit of 
grace" without "temporary awakenings, or the externals of religion."9 
The church was not, in Dana's mind, merely a voluntary society of the 
self-consciously elect but a familial institution designed for nurture and 
growth, without he thunderous interventions of "temporary awakenings." 
Baptism, then, and not the sudden mysterious seizure of conversion, "is the 
only form of admission into the Christian church"; and the work of the 
church is not to separate the wheat from the chaff but to act as an organic part 
I Dana, "The difficulty of being saved," 12-13, in Sermon Manuscript Book, 
Beinecke Library. 
6 Dana, A Century Discourse, 11, and "The Observation of the Lord's Day," in 
Sermons to Young People; Preached A.D. 1803, 1804 (New Haven, 1806), 149 
7 Dana, The Folly of Practical Atheism: A Discourse delivered in the Chapel of Yale 
College, on Lord's-Day, November 23, 1794 (New Haven, 1794), 18. 
8 Dana, The Duty of Christians to speak as the Holy Ghost teacheth: A Sermon 
preached April 29, 1789 ... At His Installation (New Haven, 1789), 18-19. 
9 Dana, "Adoption," 17, "The conversion of St. Paul proves the truth of Christian- 
ity," 48-49, and "Misconstruction of providential allotments," 18, in Sermon Manuscript 
Book. 
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of human society, as a church-in-society, fitting its members for gradual 
growth by "continuing in prayer, and in the use of other appointed means," 
and bringing them as much as possible "in a preparatory work of grace" 
through the morphology of the notorious "half-way covenant" to full Chris- 
tian maturity.10 For Dana, who had prudently married into the Whittelsey 
clan upon his arrival in Wallingford, the Wallingford church was, in both fact 
and metaphor, an embodiment of stable patriarchal uthority and one which 
James Dana, who owed both his griefs and his joys to patriarchy in Wal- 
lingford, had no hesitations defending. "Christianity is a means of uniting, 
not of separating, the children of the same common Father."" 
The New Light faction in Wallingford was unimpressed. The doctrinal 
charges against Dana were referred by the dissidents to the local New Haven 
consociation, where the New Lights had the upper hand. Rather than take its 
chances with a New Light-dominated consociation, the Wallingford church 
proceeded to ordain Dana without waiting for the customary endorsement of 
the consociation, calling in Old Light stalwarts like Isaac Stiles and Samuel 
Whittelsey, Jr., to perform the laying-on of hands. The congregation justified 
this unilateral action by its ancient right as an independent congregation to 
choose its own pastor, but the consociation was not about to accept this 
argument at face value. Dana and the Wallingford First Church were accord- 
ingly found "guilty of scandalous contempt" by the consociation and ex- 
communicated, and together they entered an ecclesiastical imbo in which 
only a handful of Old Light pastors and churches would dare to exchange 
pulpits and members with them.'2 
Dana remained under a cloud of New Light suspicion for over a decade, 
and the longer he stayed out of fellowship with the Standing Order, the darker 
the suspicions grew. At the worst Dana was rumored to be "a Heretick" who 
was "unsound as to the Trinity, Election, & univ. Salvation," and even the 
best judgment put forward by other Old Lights was that Dana's defiant 
behavior was "contemptuous & disorderly & inconsistent with his Charac- 
ter." Edwards's grandson, Timothy Dwight, mocked Dana as nothing more 
10 Dana, The Duty of Christians to speak as the Holy Ghost teacheth, 43; "The 
difficulty of being saved," 45, and "Hungering and Thirsting for righteousness," 17, in 
Sermon Manuscript Book. 
" Dana, "The Characteristics of Christianity" (p. 64) in Sermon Manuscript Book. 
For the purpose of discussing eighteenth-century Connecticut, I have treated patriarchy as 
a social order in which adult males control public institutions and the organization of their 
families, and speak as their family's voice in their communities...see Toby Ditz, Property 
and Kinship: Inheritance in Early Connecticut, 1750-1820 (Princeton, 1986), 119. 
12 Edmund S. Morgan, The Gentle Puritan: A Life of Ezra Stiles, 1727-1795 (New 
Haven, 1962), 198-99; Public Records of the Colony of Connecticut, ed. C. J. Hoadly (New 
York, 1968 [1880]), 344; Davis, History of Wallingford, 196-97; Leonard Bacon, "Histori- 
cal Discourse Delivered at Norwich, June 23, 1859," in Contributions to the Ecclesiastical 
History of Connecticut (New Haven, 1861), 55-56; see also Benjamin Trumbull, A Com- 
plete History of Connecticut, Civil and Ecclesiastical (2 vols.; New Haven, 1818), II, 480- 
526. 
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than a "milky preacher" and a "hackney coachman of whores."13 For a 
hundred years afterwards the rumors lingered in the Connecticut churches 
that James Dana held "nothing more than that which is commonly known as 
the Arminian Doctrine" and had never impressed any of his parishioners that 
"he was hearing that upon which the immediate acceptance of which his 
soul's salvation was depending."14 
That all of his sufferings had something to do with Jonathan Edwards, 
Dana might have been reasonably but only vaguely sure, but only because 
Edwards was one of the principal architects of the New Light. He had read 
Edwards's books in the 1750s, including Freedom of the Will, but shrugged 
them off as too esoteric in their arguments o be much worry. It was not until 
1765, eight years after the Wallingford controversy had left Dana and 
Wallingford outside the Standing Order, that Edwards's chief disciple, 
Samuel Hopkins, published a sensational Inquiry Concerning the Promises 
of the Gospel which blew the lid off Connecticut's uneasy post-Awakening 
quiet. In it Hopkins pushed New Light ultraism nearly as far as it could be 
pushed: sinners could not use the means of grace to repent because sinners 
(by analytic definition) are incapable of doing anything which pleases God; 
sinners who attempt to use the means of grace are pretenders who purposely 
preoccupy themselves with the "means" in order to avoid doing what they 
must do immediately, which is repent; doing good to one's neighbor apart 
from regeneration is no better than cutting the neighbor's throat, since it 
proceeds from an unholy motive; everyone is obliged by their natural abili- 
ties to obey the law of God fully, but utterly disabled by their moral inability 
without divine regeneration; and the church is composed of the self-con- 
sciously regenerate and not half-way covenanters, whose willingness to obey 
God runs all the way up to a willingness to be damned, if need be."5 
Hopkins's Inquiry was one of the early contributions towhat became known 
as the New Divinity, the most radical version of the New Light yet to appear 
in New England, and the version most clearly destructive of the patriarchal 
church. As James Dana read Hopkins, the scales fell from his eyes; and he 
saw at once that the demonic intellectual power behind the New Divinity, and 
1' Ezra Stiles, The Literary Diary of Ezra Stiles, D.D. (3 vols.; New York, 1901), III, 
355-56; Noah Hobart to Solomon Williams, 25 November 1758, in Miscellaneous Collec- 
tions, Massachusetts Historical Society; Dwight, in Kenneth Silverman, Timothy Dwight 
(New York, 1969), 102. 
14 Leonard Bacon, Thirteen Historical Discourses, 276-77; see Conrad Wright, The 
Beginnings of Unitarianism in America (Boston, 1952), 283, who still enlisted Dana as "an 
Arminian at the beginning of his ministry" another hundred years on. 
' Hopkins, "An Inquiry Concerning the Promises of the Gospel" (1765), "The True 
State and Character of the Unregenerate ... being a Reply to Mr. Mill's Inquiry" (1767), 
and "The Cause, Nature and Means of Regeneration," in Works (3 vols.; Boston, 1854), 
III, 199-200, 309-10, 312, 561, 567; see also Joseph Conforti, "Samuel Hopkins and the 
New Divinity: Theology, Ethics, and Social Reform in Eighteenth Century America," in 
William and Mary Quarterly, 34 (1977), 572-89. 
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in all his troubles in Wallingford, lay in Jonathan Edwards and his marvelous 
treatise on Freedom of the Will.16 
Jonathan Edwards knew about Hobbes, too, and he had been appalled, 
first by the skill with which Hobbes took that most salient of Calvinist 
doctrines, divine predestination, and turned it into a soulless determinism, 
and second, by the unseemly speed with which his fellow Calvinists panicked 
and bolted from their ancestral creed to embrace some form of free-willism. 
Hobbes provoked this panic by treating the action of willing as nothing more 
than the last moment in a series of alternations between fear and appetite. 
Hobbes thought of volition as a one-stage process, in which willing was 
merely a name attached to the last segment in the process of appetite, and 
which could not be interrupted by a process of further deliberation within the 
will, or the act of willing, itself. Consequently, the outcomes of all choices 
are necessary ones because they cannot be other than what the last appetite is, 
and the will could be spoken of as "free" not because it possesses power but 
simply because it possesses ability or opportunity.17 What frightened 
Hobbes's English Protestant readers was the way Hobbes hooked this one- 
stage version of volition not to divine providence but to human appetite. In 
an intellectual climate already made jittery by mechanistic Cartesianism, 
Hobbes had produced a model of human choice which was nothing more than 
necessity, as fully deterministic as any Calvinist or Augustinian determinism, 
and made it work purely as a simple, natural mechanism responding (without 
the power of creating alternatives) to fear and appetite, pleasure and pain. 
And so a great stampede ensued among English Protestants, who fled 
from all forms of determinism and necessity lest they play into Hobbes's 
mechanistic hands. They grasped instead for models of choice which would 
grant he deliberation Hobbes had denied to the will and which would open 
up the process of volition into a two-stage process that allowed the will to 
dally over the messages sent it by the appetites and if necessary to suspend 
choosing entirely, for it was in this way only that establishment Protestants 
like Samuel Clarke could protect hemselves from the frightening conclusion 
that human beings were merely biological mechanisms responding to the 
necessary dictates of desire."8 It was only by positing this power of "suspen- 
sion" that English Protestants believed they still had evidence of the superi- 
ority of the human soul to the relentless clashing of mechanistic gears, and it 
was this that led New England Calvinists to trim the sails of their Calvinism 
lest they be mistaken for the disciples of Hobbes. 
16 James Dana to Ezra Stiles, 1 May 1769, in Ezra Stiles Papers (microfilm reel 3). 
17 Hobbes, "Supplement from Liberty and Necessity," Hobbes: Selections, ed. F. J. E. 
Woodbridge (New York, 1930), 205-6. 
18 R. F. Stalley, "The Will in Hume's Treatise," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 
24 (1986), 41-53; John H. Gay, "Matter and Freedom in the Thought of Samuel Clarke," 
JHI, 24 (1963), 85-106; John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule, and Religion: The Age of 
Enlightenment inEngland, 1660-1750 (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), 208ff. 
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Jonathan Edwards was more suspicious of the free-willers than he was of 
Hobbes, and from his provincial perspective in the Connecticut river valley, 
he viewed the incursions of free-willism as nothing less than a treasonous 
"Arminianism" that stole God's divine honor even as it stole his supreme 
determining power over all events. When at last Edwards was free to turn his 
attention fully to the problem in the 1750s, he was quite willing to turn 
Hobbes back on Hobbes and reappropriate a one-stage model of volition to 
describe human choice in a divinely-determined universe.19 Edwards had two 
major arguments o put forward concerning freedom of the will. One of them 
was strictly psychological, and it dealt with the precise description of voli- 
tion. In a manner strikingly reminiscent of Hobbes, Edwards described the 
will as "that by which the mind chooses anything"...which is the same thing 
as saying that the will has no independent functions or powers of its own but 
acts strictly as the last segment of the mind's inclination toward an object. "It 
will not appear," as the two-stagers had claimed, that "a man's choosing, 
liking best or being best pleased with a thing are not the same with his willing 
that thing"; and in a direct criticism of two-stage models of choice, Edwards 
insisted that "a man never, in any instance, wills anything contrary to his 
desires, or desires anything contrary to his will."20 Just as Hobbes had seen 
"the last appetite" as the cause of a choice, so Edwards proposed "motives" 
as the cause of choice, with a "motive" in this case being "something that is 
extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving 
faculty." To the extent that a given motive is perceived as "the greatest 
apparent good" among all other motives, the will apprehends the object 
represented by the motive (Oust like Hobbes's "last appetite") without he 
intervention of any other deliberation. So close in fact is the connection 
between the motive and choice that "it must be true, in some sense, that the 
will always is as the greatest apparent good is."21 
This explained very neatly how God was able to determine all events 
without ever violating human freedom. For if the will was created simply to 
follow the lead of perception, then its true freedom lay precisely in following 
those leads, and God had only to present he proper motive to a perceiving 
individual of the required "temper" (depraved, regenerated, or otherwise) in 
1' Clyde S. Holbrook, The Ethics of Jonathan Edwards: Morality and Aesthetics (Ann 
Arbor, Mich., 1973), 28, 38; JE's manuscripts indicate that he had some exposure, direct or 
indirect, to Hobbes as early as the 1720s... see "Miscellanies 'f' " in Harvey G. Townsend 
(ed.), The Philosophy of Jonathan Edwards From His Private Manuscripts (rept. Westport, 
Conn., 1972 [1955]), 193. 
20 The Works of Jonathan Edwards: Freedom of the Will, ed. Paul Ramsey (New 
Haven, 1957), 137-40; see also James Hoopes, Consciousness in New England: From 
Puritanism and Ideas to Psychoanalysis and Semiotic (Baltimore, 1989), 90-91, and 
Norman S. Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought and Its British Context (Chapel 
Hill, 1981), 292-98. 
21 Freedom of the Will, 142, 146-47. 
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the proper circumstances for a perfectly predictable and inevitable result to 
ensue freely. Far from this releasing Edwards from the suspicion of mecha- 
nism, however, it merely suggested to suspicious readers that all human 
behavior really was necessary after all, with God arranging the pieces to 
create an illusion of freedom. Anticipating this objection, Edwards insisted 
that there are various ways of defining necessity.22 There is natural necessity, 
which is what people usually think of when they think of necessity, as when 
"men are under ... the force of natural causes" such as "pain when their 
bodies are wounded" or when "men's bodies move downwards, when there 
is nothing to support hem." In order to be free from natural necessity, 
people must struggle; and when their struggles are unsuccessful, we agree 
that they cannot be considered to be free. What is more, we do not hold them 
morally responsible for the performance of actions that they were naturally 
unable to perform. However, there are more kinds of necessity than those 
which arise only from "natural causes," Edwards added; there is also moral 
necessity, which springs from "moral causes, such as habits and dispositions 
of the heart, and moral motives and inducements."23 In that case the moral 
necessity created by such a habit, if a good one, is never something to be 
complained about or groaned under; in fact, having that kind of necessity 
govern human conduct is exactly what makes us praise some people as good, 
noble, or reliable, while being governed by evil habits is just what causes us 
to condemn and criticize others. 
This left Edwards free to draw two conclusions, one that immediately 
addressed the conundrum created by Hobbes and another, less apparent, one 
which was reserved for the nearer audience of New England Calvinism. On 
the most obvious level Edwards's definition of volition and his skilful 
deployment of the idea of motives as divine agents allowed him to coopt 
Hobbes's one-stage determinism and turn it back into an engine of Calvinis- 
tic apologetics, and in the process Edwards would demonstrate hat the only 
realistic defense for theism in the eighteenth-century was a full-blown moral 
determinism. What was less obvious was the other conclusion which Ed- 
wards drew, which faced back toward the Old Lights and their flight from the 
Great Awakening into "Arminianism." Ifmoral necessity and natural neces- 
sity did indeed represent two entirely separate and distinguishable strands of 
determined conduct, then it was possible to make a similar working distinc- 
tion between natural and moral inability as well; and one had only to transfer 
that distinction out of the context of eighteenth-century moral philosophy 
and deposit it in the context of Edwards's writings on revival and the 
22 Edwards made several distinctions within the term necessity, the most primary being 
a distinction between "relative" necessity, where the necessary result comes from the 
coercive physical relations of bodies, and "philosophical" necessity, which describes the 
connections which exist between terms. He subsumed his discussion of natural and moral 
necessity under the heading of "philosophical" necessity (Freedom of the Will, 151-52). 
23 Freedom of the Will, 157-60. 
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Awakenings and his debates with the Old Lights in the 1740s for it to become 
clear that Edwards had fashioned a lever which could topple the entire Old 
Light-Old Calvinist edifice. For on that logic there is no need for the gradual 
use of the means of grace to bring someone closer to salvation: natural ability 
makes that available now. There is no use for half-way covenants, which only 
delay the sinner's free choice, or for the church-in-society, since every 
repentant sinner knows by direct self-inspection the operation of their own 
will and with whom they ought to associate. When moral and natural ability 
coincide, the twice-born know where their real family is to be found.24 
All of this might have been much clearer in 1754 when Edwards pub- 
lished Freedom of the Will, had not the book itself been spun out to enormous 
length with a host of ancillary debates over biblical exegesis and examina- 
tions of the self-contradictions of "Arninian" logic. It was not until 1765, 
when Hopkins's Inquiry lifted the arguments on natural ability/moral inabil- 
ity out of Freedom of the Will and dropped them heavily onto the Old 
Calvinists, that James Dana realized that Jonathan Edwards and Freedom of 
the Will was the real enemy. By the spring of 1769 he was able to inform Ezra 
Stiles that he was "well nigh finished ... some remarks on the most elaborate 
metaphysical production ever published in this country," and in the follow- 
ing year he published his lengthy Examination of the late Rev'd President 
Edwards's 'Enquiry on Freedom of Will. '25 Two years later, Edwards's 
successor in the church and mission at Stockbridge, Stephen West, published 
a reply to Dana's Examination, and thereupon Dana began assembling 
material for another assault on Edwards (appealing, among other efforts, to 
Andrew Eliot to confirm the rumor Dana had heard that "the english impres- 
sion of Mr. Edwards on the will was promoted by the deists in London; and 
that the rakes in Holland had procured a dutch translation of it").26 In 1773 
Dana unleashed an equally lengthy "Examination of the Late Rev'd Presi- 
dent Edwards 's Enquiry on Freedom of Will, " continued, in which he largely 
ignored West and resumed his argument with Edwards where he had left off 
three years before. 
Dana wasted no time in the first Examination in marking out the chief 
problem with Edwards: too ambitious and too restless an intellect o abide 
content with the simple antinomy of divine providence and free moral choice, 
Edwards had plunged over his head into "elaborate and intricate" meta- 
physical speculations, and only Edwards's "strong practical sense of reli- 
24 On Edwards's immediatism see "Miscellaneous Remarks," Edward Hickman (ed.), 
The Works of Jonathan Edwards (2 vols.; London, 1976 [1834]), II, 545, 563; see also 
Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared: Grace and Conversion in Puritan New England (New 
Haven, 1966), 209-12. 
25 Dana to Ezra Stiles, 1 May 1769, in Ezra Stiles Papers [microfilm reel 3], Beinecke 
Library. 
26 Dana to Andrew Eliot, 9 July 1773, in Andrews-Eliot Papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society. 
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gion" had actually kept him from having "philosophised" himself into 
"scepticism." The principal point on which Dana sought o demonstrate hat 
folly in his first Examination was the problem of motives, since the whole 
structure of Edwards's psychology of volition hung on the functions he 
attributed tomotives. Dana did not propose to question "whether the highest 
motive always hath a causal influence on the will"...that much was simply a 
tautology. 
The real question was how any motive came to be "highest in the mind's 
view."27 That, Dana was delighted to point out, Edwards had never really 
explained beyond the simple suggestion that motives might derive their force 
sometimes from the inherent attractiveness of the motive itself and some- 
times from the inclinations of the perceiver of the motive. But this, Dana 
declared, only raised more questions than it answered: if the power of a 
motive lies in the motive itself, then how can we escape the inference that 
God deliberately tempts people when he places highly attractive but highly 
immoral motives in their path and thus reveals himself as the author of sin? 
"Will it now be said, that GOD is the cause of those ... acts of the will, which 
are so odious in their nature?" Dana asked: "On Mr. Edwards's scheme this 
must be said." Or if motives derive their force from the "temper" of the 
perceiving individual, then isn't it really their "temper" which places them 
at fault and not their wills? "If an intrinsic ause, or original bias and 
propensity, bethat necessity by which the will is determined, what is this but 
being determined by nature?"28 The point is that both interpretations of the 
power of motives are alike ridiculous; Edwards cannot really say for certain 
what makes one motive greater or better than another, and neither can anyone 
else. "And thus the enquiry may be pursued in infinitum (which shews, by 
the way, the futility, at least, of entering on such an enquiry as that which is 
the subject of Mr. Edwards's book)."29 
The second object of Dana's attack in the first Examination had to be the 
natural/moral necessity dichotomy; if Edwards's scheme of motives ex- 
plained how choices became necessary, the natural/moral necessity di- 
chotomy was needed to explain how necessary choices were compatible with 
moral responsibility. For Dana exploding this explanation was simply a 
27 Dana, An Examination of the late Rev'd President Edwards's "Enquiry on Freedom 
of Will" (Boston, 1770), iii-iv, 1. Only four relatively brief commentaries have been 
written on Dana's criticism of Edwards, and all of them respond to Dana as little more than 
a footnote ither to Edwards (Paul Ramsey's introduction to Freedom of the Will and 
Claude M. Newlin, Philosophy and Religion in Colonial America [New York, 1962], 1 61 ff) 
or to anti-Calvinism (Conrad Wright, The Beginnings of Unitarianism in America [Boston, 
1955], 106ff and Joseph Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New 
England Theology [New York, 1932], 229-36). 
28 An Examination, 46-49, 53-56, 75; the same objection was raised by Arthur Murphy 
in his review essay on Paul Ramsey's Yale edition of Freedom of the Will...see "Jonathan 
Edwards on Free Will and Moral Agency," Philosophical Quarterly, 68 (1959), 200ff. 
29 An Examination, 6. 
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matter of insisting that the natural/moral necessity dichotomy was a distinc- 
tion without a difference. As Dana complained, 
What Mr. Edwards intended by a moral cause, we cannot satisfy 
ourselves. Sometimes he appears to reason as if supposed there was 
really no distinction between a moral and natural cause, or none to be 
perceived; while more generally he seems to suppose a distinction of 
great importance; which, however, he hath not so clearly pointed out 
as out as were to be wished. 
The reason why Dana saw no clear distinction, and why Edwards was unable 
to make one, was that in practical terms the kinds of causation and ability 
which Edwards categorized as natural and moral intermix themselves. Natu- 
ral necessity, which produces results which coerce us and which we struggle 
against, and moral necessity, in which we move unthinkingly or unresistingly 
along with a motive, overlap and produce behaviors where it is difficult to 
distinguish coercion from cooperation. "There is the joint influence of moral 
and natural necessity in moral events," Dana wrote, "their influence is 
closely linked."30 
The real question in determining freedom and responsibility, according 
to Dana, was not whether our choices are the product of natural or moral 
necessity (or ability) but whether our choices could have been other than they 
were.. whether, in other words, there always exists, under natural or moral 
necessity, not just the opportunity to choose what the will chooses but 
whether, at the very moment of choosing, the possibility exists of selecting 
an alternative to what we actually chose. One may suggest that a moral 
necessity is perfectly compatible with freedom and responsibility while a 
natural necessity is not (or that a natural ability always involves one in 
responsibility even while laboring under a moral inability), but this means 
nothing if no alternatives to necessity exist. "If no being can chuse or act 
otherwise than he doth, we cannot conceive of a necessity more absolute." If 
not, then all the talk about necessity, natural or moral, is really about 
mechanism. "If there be a real necessity on the mind in all its acts, it is quite 
immaterial whether this necessity, by which the mind is in every instance 
determined, be called natural or moral."'31 This made it clear, at least to 
James Dana's unmitigated satisfaction, that both Edwards's scheme of mo- 
tives and the natural/moral necessity dichotomy could lead nowhere but to 
"atheism and licentiousness." Whether that meant that Edwards's book was 
really "copied from Mr. Hume, Hobbs, Spinoza, or any of the old heathen 
Philosophers, we do not say."32 
30 Ibid., 43-44. 
31 Ibid., 80-81. 
32 Ibid., 84. 
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Dana's first Examination was long on criticism but short on positive 
alternatives. Fully as committed to a cautious "common sense" realism as 
Edwards was to immaterialism, Dana found freedom and responsibility by 
intuition rather than by analysis. "That we have internal liberty is apparent 
from our moral discernment," Dana insisted, "Let a man look into his own 
breast, and there he cannot but perceive inward freedom.. Inward Free- 
dom.. For if freedom be not in the mind, it is nowhere." Consequently, Dana 
continued, Edwards's endless distinctions between necessities and abilities 
serve no real purpose. "The simplest notion of liberty we shall argue for is 
this, that mankind have inward moral freedom ... without endeavoring to 
state the exact measure in which it is possessed or within what sphere 
exercised by them."33 
This led Dana to the practical base of his loathing for Edwards; for while 
Dana was careful to "acknowledge the fallen state of our nature, and the 
impotency derived from the fall" and all the other proper loci of Calvinist 
doctrine, the only real question which mattered for Dana was "whether 
salvation is offered to sinners on practicable terms." Dana had been con- 
vinced both by the New Lights who had disrupted his life in Wallingford and 
by the New Divinity who wanted to abandon the "use of means" that 
Edwards's theory of human volition rendered salvation nearly as impracti- 
cable as it could become. "Is there no impropriety," Dana raged, "is there 
not a palpable contradiction, in speaking of an offer on terms known to be 
morally impossible?"34 
It did not take long for the Edwardseans to respond to Dana. Stephen 
West, who was wielding the flail of the New Divinity through the Berkshires, 
published his Essay on Moral Agency in 1772, chiding Dana for blaming 
Edwards without ever offering an alternative model of volition of his own. As 
it was, West insisted, Dana had deliberately misread Edwards's definition of 
necessity as meaning raw compulsion. That "there is a connection between 
antecedent states of mind, and voluntary exertions, this implieth all the 
necessity which that great Author, upon whom the Ex ...... r is animadverting, 
ever urgeth."35 What West fully expected that Dana was concealing, as his 
own idea of volition, was simply another two-stage model which permitted 
33 Ibid., v, 88; Dana invokes at this point an argument which had become customary 
within the discourse of eighteenth-century Scottish Enlightenment philosophy; see Thomas 
Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of the Mind, ed. Baruch Brody (Cambridge, Mass., 
1969), 259, 283, and Selwyn A. Grave, The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense (Oxford, 
1960), 206-7. 
34 An Examination, 105. 
35 Stephen West, An Essay on Moral Agency (Salem, Mass., 1794) 34; defining what 
was meant by "connection," however, became a question of its own for the New Divinity, 
who used "connection" (as Edwards did) in an occasionalist sense to denote the divinely- 
guaranteed correspondence of two events which do not rely on their correspondence for an 
actual cause-effect relationship; and so for West (56), "Habit and Temper mean nothing 
more than a certain fixt connection between our present exercises of will and future 
voluntary exertions of the same general nature and denominations." 
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deliberation and suspension to occur somewhere between the choice of the 
intellect and the actual performance of an action. Whatever other messages 
Dana's intuitions might be giving him about freedom, West was sure that the 
mind "is conscious of a power of will, only in the exercises of volition." That 
minds should intuit a freedom to deliberate or suspend choice in the will was 
nonsense: "That the mind should be conscious of a power of choice which is 
distinguishable from actual choosing, is no more conceivable, than that we 
should be conscious of a power of thinking and perceiving, without at the 
same time feeling or exercising any perception or thought."36 
West's Essay was all the provocation Dana needed, and the next year 
Dana hurried into print The "Examination of the Late Rev'd President 
Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of Will," Continued. In it Dana frankly 
admitted his fondness for a two-stage theory of will: "The act of volition or 
choice is a different thing from the pursuit or execution of what is willed or 
chosen."37 The idea that the will rushed out to apprehend whatever the mind 
perceived as the greatest apparent good turned human beings into automa- 
tons, pulled hither-and-thither by Edwards's ineluctable motives without any 
reflection on other possible objects of choice, and to Dana this seemed 
refuted by every turn of experience. To be sure, motives are what lead us to 
choice, but they fall considerably far short of possessing the powers Edwards 
attributed tothem. "Is there, then, such a constant and unfailing connection 
or co-incidence between volition and the greatest apparent good, as is pre- 
tended?" Dana thought not: "The strongest motive is not the moral cause of 
volition," and therefore "there is no necessary coincidence between the one 
and the other." In fact "Perception and volition are as different as sight and 
taste"; and the more acquainted one becomes with human behavior, the more 
evident it is that "moral agents many times sin immediately against present 
light and conviction, while they have full in their view the wiser choice."38 
If this did not demonstrate the existence of an intermediate stage of 
deliberation and suspension in the process of volition, decisively separating 
motives from action, then there was nothing "on Mr. Edwards's scheme of 
liberty" to separate animals and humans.39 "To say, that such a creature, in 
case of a competition of objects, cannot stop and consider which reason 
directs to and govern himself accordingly, is either to deny him the power of 
reflection, or to suppose him given over to a reprobate mind." What alterna- 
tive is there in that case to considering God, as the creator of those motives, 
as "the proper efficient cause" of human behavior, including sinful behav- 
ior? Instead, Dana insisted that "a moral agent either hath power to originate 
an act of suspension and so bring himself into the view of new motives; or the 
36 Ibid., 22. 
37 The "Examination of the Late Rev'd President Edwards's Enquiry on Freedom of 
Will," Continued (New Haven, 1773), 28. 
38 Ibid., 36, 40, 138. 
39 Ibid., 30. 
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suspending act proceeds from a motive extant in his mind at the same instant 
with some motive to immediate lection or action."40 
It was far better, Dana pleaded, to drop the pretenses created by Edwards, 
along with the endless definitions and distinctions about necessity and 
connection, and admit to what common sense tells everyone. "If any truth be 
plain, this is, that man is free," Dana wrote. "Next to the consciousness of 
our own existence is that of our moral freedom."'41 For after all of Edwards's 
logical pinching and probing of free will, "all the argumentation fhis book 
really concludes in this, that God is the cause of sin."42 Common sense 
would also seem to dictate that no alternative to some form of free will 
existed apart from making God the author of sin. The folly of the answer 
demonstrated the folly of the argument. God cannot be the cause of sin, a 
"tyrannical, arbitrary prince, who aims only at his own grandeur, and the 
display of his power." God is, as Dana had been telling people all along, 
"the parent of the universe."43 
Over time, Dana's obsession with Edwards and free will produced two 
remarkably contradictory esults. As Hopkins and the New Divinity pushed 
the boundaries of Edwardsean radicalism further outwards (and drove New 
England "fast into Deism and Universalism," wrote one disgruntled Old 
Calvinist), the Standing Order came to look upon Dana more kindly, at least 
by contrast with Hopkins. In 1768 the New Haven consociation offered Dana 
and Wallingford an olive branch in the form of a promise that they would 
"freely overlook" the irregularities surrounding Dana's ordination in 1758, 
and in the same year the University of Edinburgh bestowed a further laurel of 
legitimacy with an honorary D.D.4 By 1771 Dana was being invited to sit on 
ecclesiastical councils, and in 1775 he finally joined the consociation which 
had barred him as an outlaw for nearly twenty ears. He ingratiated himself 
still further with the Standing Order by throwing his allegiance to the 
American revolutionaries in 1775, and in 1779 he delivered a sermon on the 
glories of republicanism to the Connecticut General Assembly.45 Finally, in 
1789, Dana left Wallingford to succeed his brother-in-law, Chauncey 
Whittelsey, as the pastor of the New Haven First Church, the premier Old 
Calvinist pulpit of Connecticut. James Dana had been rehabilitated. 
40 Ibid., 18. 
41 Ibid., 98. 
42 Ibid., 96, 127, 133. 
43 Ibid., 70. 
44 "At a Council of the Consociated Elders and Churches of the County of New 
Haven" and "To the Rev. Dr. Dana, Pastor ... in Wallingford" (7 November 1775), in New 
Haven East Association Papers Relating to the Church in Wallingford, 1758-1832, 
Beinecke Library; The First Congregational Church of Wallingford, Connecticut, 31. 
45 A Sermon Preached before the General Assembly of the State of Connecticut, at 
Hartford, on the Day of the Anniversary Election, May 13, 1779 (Hartford, 1779); Nathan 
0. Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Liberty: Republican Thought and the Millenium in Revolu- 
tionary New England (New Haven, 1977), 159. 
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The other way in which freedom of the will turned up in Dana's life in 
New Haven was in the construction of his republicanism. The reputation 
Dana had earned during the Revolution as a republican divine was not 
undeserved, for like a surprising number of Old Calvinists, Dana had no 
trouble assimilating free will, politics, and patriarchy. As early as 1774 Dana 
had predicted to Andrew Eliot that "divine providence will interpose" in 
America to ensure the creation of "a firm confederacy," based (as he told 
the Connecticut General Assembly in 1779) on "the natural parity of man- 
kind."46 The sanction Dana invoked for this "confederacy" was the Hebrew 
patriarchs, "with JEHOVAH at the head." Their "confederate republic" 
offered a perfect republican pattern where "equality of condition was pro- 
vided for, and the means of corruption prevented," Dana preached, and so 
"for this reason we give the preference to a representative d mocracy. "147 But 
"equality" and "democracy" did not mean for Dana what it meant for others 
in the eighteenth century, that is, the legitimized pursuit of self-interest or
economic opportunism. Dana feared that "corruption" and "the spirit of 
party" were the real fruits of self-interest and only led to what he condemned 
as "the splendour and profusion, the great inequality, which have long been 
the curse of the European nations."48 He was particularly fearful of the 
inequalities that might emerge from unfettered participation in world mar- 
kets: for Dana, republican virtue demanded a republican agrarianism where 
"the principal riches of a state consist in the fruits of the field," and though 
some measure of foreign commerce was inevitable, "a free republic, as that 
of the United States" had no business pursuing commerce on any other basis 
than strict "reciprocal advantage."49 
Unfortunately, nothing that Dana saw in the first decade of the new 
republic gave him much hope that his warnings were being heeded. "With 
accession to our population, commerce and wealth, and other improvements, 
have we not declined rather then improved in vital piety and good morals?" 
he asked in the year of the Louisiana Purchase.50 The principal evidence Dana 
found for this decline was the decay of patriarchy. "Family religion is in a 
manner extinguished," Dana complained, and he was sure that no "past 
period has endangered the faith and morals of youth comparably with the 
present." Post-Revolutionary New England held fewer and fewer opportuni- 
4 Dana to Andrew Eliot, 30 May 1774, in Andrews-Eliot Papers, Massachusetts 
Historical Society; Dana, A Sermon,... May 13 1779, 9. 
47 A Sermon,... May 17, 1779, 17, 19; and The Intent of Capital Punishment: A 
Discourse delivered in the City of New-Haven October 20 1796 (New Haven, 1796), 9. 
48 "Civil Union" (pp. 62-63) in Sermon Manuscript Book; Dana, "Frugality," in 
Sermons to Young People, 267. 
49 A Sermon,... May 17, 1779, 21, 24, 41; Dana, "Frugality," in Sermons to Young 
People, 267. 
50 "Self-Dedication" and "Motives to a Conversation Becoming the Gospel," in 
Sermons to Young People, 128. 500. 
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ties for the increasingly land-locked sons of New England fathers; and as 
landless sons headed westward into uncertain futures, Dana could only 
protest hat true "sons wish not to be discharged from the obedience of their 
parents. At least those who do, have not a filial spirit.""5 
The remedies which Dana proposed for this crisis almost make the word 
republican fail on the lips. For what Dana wanted as a safeguard from 
corruption was compulsion: shoring up state-funded Congregationalism, 
religious supervision of public education, sumptuary laws (since "bribery, 
corruption and tyranny prevail wherever luxury doth"), and "public ack- 
nowledgement of a Supreme Being."52 The republican society of Dana's 
imagining was a coercive one, in which "we have various connections with 
our fellow creatures, and different relations in society; are qualified in 
different respects and degrees to be helpful to one another; are mutually 
dependent...." 53 Liberal individualism could not have been more foreign to 
Dana's notion of republican patriarchy: "we are not at liberty to use or 
neglect our talents, or to manage them as we please." Therefore, it worried 
Dana not at all that his republicanism ight actually involve "some abridge- 
ments of liberty."54 The various liberal or individualist reifications of repub- 
licanism on offer in the early republic held no attraction for Dana, who 
thought hat the very logic of republicanism eant the subordination of the 
individual to the collective, the self to society, the children to the parents, 
and the will to the mind. 
This tightly regulated version of republicanism sits rather strangely 
beside Dana's metaphysical free-willism, and even though the critics of the 
"republican synthesis" have insisted that the republican ideology of the 
early national era often involves the embrace and convergence of contradic- 
tory elements, not nearly enough effort has been put into discerning what 
philosophical threads may have been holding those elements together.55 In
Dana's case, however, the thread that connects politics and metaphysics may 
lie surprisingly close at hand, that is, in what Dana's life-long argument with 
Jonathan Edwards had taught him about freedom of the will. Dana believed 
51 Dana, "Caution Against Bad Company," in Sermons to Young People, 230; 
"Adoption" (p. 9) in Sermon Manuscript Book. 
52 Dana, A Sermon,... May 17, 1779, 25; "Public Worship" (p. 16) in Sermon 
Manuscript Book. 
53 Dana, The Character and Reward of the good and faithful Servant: A Sermon 
occasioned by the much lamented death of Charles Whittelsey (Boston, 1764), 18. 
54 Dana, The African Slave Trade: A Discourse delivered in the city of New-Haven, 
September 9, 1790 (New Haven, 1791), 1 1. 
55 See James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republican- 
ism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse," Journal of American History, 74 
(1987), 9-33, Jeffrey C. Isaac, "Republicanism vs. Liberalism? A Reconsideration," 
History of Political Thought, 9 (1988), 349-77, Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: 
Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill, 1980), 236-39, and Daniel T. 
Rodgers's survey of the development of "republican" interpretations, "Republicanism: 
The Career of a Concept," Journal of American History, 79 (1992), 36. 
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that human volition was a two-stage process which permitted eliberation 
and suspension and did not move (as Edwards had said) spontaneously and 
predictably from perception to action, and therefore from a human perspec- 
tive there would always be, no matter what the motives, an absence of 
certainty about the outcomes of human action. "I do not admit," Dana had 
told John Perkins in 1774, "that the mind always determines (if it doth 
generally) on what appears best," and that was why Dana had found it risky 
to allow people "to act according to their acknowledged sense & feeling."56 
The only guarantee of conduct, in that case, was the application of fatherly 
restraint and compulsion lest, "soured by childish controversy," people "act 
the part of children who quarrel on the most trivial occasions."57 
Thus Dana concentrated on the need to exercise control over both the self 
and republican society, for in a moral universe in which there is no immediate 
connection between motives and actions and in which reason and delibera- 
tion can form their own conclusions, the mere presentation of "motives" 
can no longer be relied upon to ensure proper behavior. In contrast o the 
portrait of Dana and Edwards offered by Jay Fliegelman, it is Dana the 
"Arminian" who is obsessed with the attenuation of patriarchy, while Ed- 
wards's greatest moment of trial came as a result of his rebellion against the 
patriarchal domination of his Northampton parish by his powerful relatives, 
the Williamses.58 
This clearly sets Dana off from the liberal republicanism of The Federal- 
ist Papers and the Constitution, since the philosophers of the Constitution 
shared little of Dana's faith that the popular will could be guided by reason or 
deliberation, or rescued from irrationality and sentiment by the application of 
fatherly authority. But it also highlights another peculiar correlation, this 
time between the Edwardseans and The Federalist. While Dana held that 
willing was rational and deliberative (and therefore best contained within 
some form of established or enlightened heirarchy), both the Edwardseans 
and the authors of The Federalist saw humankind as governed entirely by the 
perception of the greatest apparent good (whether in the form of "motives" 
or "interest") and carried along on their paths by passion (whether sacred or 
secular) in their response to that perception rather than by self-restrained 
choices. Madison, for instance, was certainly no Edwardsean, and the shape 
of his republicanism also contains many more irregularities than the schol- 
arly debates of the 1980s on republicanism imagined. Observers then and 
now, however, have remarked on the similarities of Madison's and Ed- 
wards's deterministic description of human psychology; and it is not hard to 
discover adical Edwardseans who, like Nathaniel Niles in 1774, uttered what 
56 Dana to [John] Perkins, 7 March 1774, American Antiquarian Society. 
57 The Heavenly Mansions: A Sermon preached May 14, 1795, in the city of New Haven 
at the Interment of the Reverend Ezra Stiles D.D., LL.D. (New Haven, 1795), 17. 
58 Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution Against Patriarchal 
Authority, 1750-1800 (Cambridge, 1982), 34-35, 169-70. 
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could have been a theological corollary to Madison's discussion of faction in 
The Federalist No. 10: 
The saint will never be required to do anything irksome or disagree- 
able, because his heart will spontaneously choose to do, whatever his 
sovereign will choose to command. Thus while the laws of Christ 
will be the only standard of the thoughts and exercises of all, every 
one will be a law to himself. They will need to do nothing more than 
comply with their own inclination, in order to a perfect compliance 
with the will of Christ; because the same mind will be in them, that is 
also in Christ.59 
As William Breitenbach has pointed out in his study of New Divinity 
theories of "disinterested benevolence," the Edwardseans helped push New 
Englanders toward a new mentality of self-interestedness, competition, and a 
benevolent but decidedly individualistic liberal brand of republicanism.. .the 
republicanism, inother words, of Madison and not James Dana.60 
What Dana's anxiety in his 1782 letter to Ezra Stiles suggests is that, in 
the increasingly tangled theoretical thicket of the "republican synthesis" and 
its critics, one particuarly important piece of the overall republican picture 
has been overlooked. While the "republican synthesis" has been repeatedly 
criticized for its neglect of ideology, of economics, and even of millenialism, 
none of these criticisms has noticed the absence of the clearest cognate of this 
discourse about political iberty, and this is metaphysical liberty and freedom 
of the will. If Dana's fears about Edwards signal anything, itis that the two 
discourses about liberty.. .one a matter of politics, the other a matter of 
metaphysics... frequently became entangled in the new republic; what the 
structure of his republicanism suggests, in turn, is that the ways in which 
eighteenth-century Americans chose to speak about the metaphysics of deter- 
minism influenced the way they chose to define the politics of a republican 
society. Thus, one piece of Alan Heimert's argument about religion and the 
American revolution can find in Dana's quarrel with Edwards an unexpected 
confirmation: Dana's Old Calvinist defense of free will, although it occurs 
within a republican context, does not lead to a more democratic defense of 
social or political freedom, but to less freedom.6" By the same token, defend- 
ers of theological or metaphysical determinism like Edwards and Hopkins 
59 Niles, Two Discourses on Liberty (Newburyport, Mass., 1774), 53-54. 
6 Breitenbach, "Unregenerate Doings: Selflessness and Selfishness in New Divinity 
Theology," American Quarterly, 34 (1983), 498-502; see also David W. Kling, A Field of 
Divine Wonders: The New Divinity and Village Revivals in Northwestern Connecticut, 
1792-1822 (University Park, Penn., 1993), 44-45. 
61 Heimert, Religion and the American Mind from the Great Awakening to the 
Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1966), 457-60, 500-509. 
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lead, as Dana had feared, to the subversion of hierarchy, or at least to the 
hierarchy of James Dana.62 
The distance one travels between The Federalist and Jonathan Edwards 
seems at first so great that one scarcely thinks of them as similar, much less 
members of a dialogue over both republicanism and free will with the likes of 
James Dana. But within a polity dedicated to propositions about liberty, there 
has always been a discernible symmetry between notions of "free" political 
choice and notions about "free" psychological or metaphysical choices, a 
symmetry that extends to Robert Owen, Abraham Lincoln, and B. F. Skinner 
as much as Dana, Madison, and Edwards. What has usually obscured that 
symmetry has been, partly, the pragmatic penchant (beginning with William 
James's attempt o dismiss "free will" as a non-problem in 1907) for 
evading the question as a particularly bad example of metaphysics or "hard" 
psychology (as in discourses about "nature" or "drives"); and more largely, 
the paradoxical shape of that symmetry inAmerican thought, which repeat- 
edly casts fatalists and Calvinists in the role of emancipators, and casts free- 
willers and Arminians as anxious controllers. In that respect Dana's com- 
mentaries on Edwards and his sermons on republicanism are an illuminating 
moment, as much for questioning evasions of metaphysics as for understand- 
ing politics, psychology, and metaphysics together as parts of a single 
discourse on the possibilities of freedom in the eighteenth century.63 The 
models of human action which both Edwards and Dana sanctioned continued 
alternately toantagonize and fascinate American religious thinkers for half-a- 
century afterwards, but they were models which spoke to far more than 
narrow dogmatic oncerns. For Americans in the new republic, any descrip- 
tion of freedom was a description of the larger political world they hoped to 
inhabit and the universe of meaning which gave them hope; in that context, 
the comparative intricacies of determinism, necessity, and fatalism only 
waited for the opportunity ofpatient controversy to become descriptions of 
Americans themselves, as moral individuals, as families, and as a republic. 
The Charles Warren Center, Harvard University. 
62 Gerald R. McDermott, One Holy and Happy Society: The Public Theology of 
Jonathan Edwards (University Park, Penn., 1992), 157-72; see also Jon Pahl, "Jonathan 
Edwards and the Aristocracy of Grace," Fides et Historia, 25 (1993), 62-72. 
63 See Jon Pahl, Paradox Lost: Free Will and Political Liberty in American Culture, 
1630-1760 (Baltimore, 1992), and for a shorter but more provocative discussion of this 
connection in the nineteenth century, see David Brion Davis, "Reconsidering the Coloni- 
zation Movement: Leonard Bacon and the Problem of Evil," Intellectual History Newslet- 
ter, 14 (1992), 3-16. 
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